In this article we study optimal admission to an M/M/k/N queue with several customer types. The reward structure consists of revenues collected from admitted customers and holding costs, both of which depend on customer types. This article studies average rewards per unit time and describes the structures of stationary optimal, canonical, bias optimal, and Blackwell optimal policies. Similar to the case without holding costs, bias optimal and Blackwell optimal policies are unique, coincide, and have a trunk reservation form with the largest optimal control level for each customer type. Problems with one holding cost rate have been studied previously in the literature.
INTRODUCTION
We consider an M/M/k/N queue with m customer types, where m ≥ 1. Customers of type j, j = 1, 2, . . . , m, arrive at the system according to independent Poisson processes with rates λ j , where 0 < λ j < ∞. When a customer arrives at the system, its type becomes known. There are k identical servers in the system, where k ≥ 1. The service times are independent, do not depend on the customer types, and are exponentially distributed with rate μ, where 0 < μ < ∞. When there are n customers in the system, the total service rate of the system is μ n , where μ n = nμ for n = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, and μ n = kμ for n = k, k + 1, . . . , N. Moreover, there is no preemption for customers. The queue follows the first in-first out (FIFO) rule.
At the arrival epochs, the system manager decides whether an arrival can enter the system. If a customer sees less than k customers in the system and is admitted, the customer goes to a free server immediately. If a customer sees at least k customers in the system and is admitted, the customer waits in the queue for service. If there are N customers in the system, the system is full and all of the arrivals are rejected. Upon admitting a customer, the system collects a positive reward that depends on the customer type and incurs a nonnegative random holding cost which depends on the customer type and the number of customers in the system that the admitted customer sees.
Let r j (n) be the net reward collected by the system if a customer of type j sees n customers in the system and is admitted. The net rewards r j (n) are positive constants for n = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, and are nonincreasing in n = k − 1, k, . . . , N − 1. The dependence of r j (n) on n reflects the fact that net rewards depend on waiting times. Furthermore, we assume that different customer types have different reward functions. When an arrival is rejected, the system does not collect any reward.
The objective is to maximize the long-run average reward. We call a policy that maximizes the long-run average reward an optimal policy. In addition to average reward optimality, we also consider three more selective policies: canonical, bias optimal, and Blackwell optimal policies. The following is the definition of a trunk reservation policy. The optimal admission control problem has been extensively studied in the literature, but the results are limited to the models without holding costs or with holding costs that do not depend on customer types. Miller [11] [4] considered general birth and death processes and studied a problem with a constraint. In particular, they extended Miller's [11] result to an M/M/k/N queue without holding costs. In addition, Feinberg and Reiman [4] showed that any randomized stationary optimal policy for a problem without holding costs is a randomized TRP. Lewis, Ayhan, and Foley [10] provided a simpler proof of this fact for (nonrandomized) stationary policies. Problems with more general constraints than in [4] were studied by Fan-Orzechowski and Feinberg [2, 3] .
Several optimal admission control problems with holding costs have been studied. Naor [13] proved the existence of an optimal TRP for an M/M/1 queue with one customer type and linear holding costs. Knudsen [9] extended Naor's result to an M/M/k queue. Yechiali [18, 19] extended Naor's and Knudsen's results to GI/M/1 and GI/M/k queues with one customer type and linear holding costs. Stidham [15] proved the existence of an optimal TRP for a GI/M/1 queue with one customer type and convex nondecreasing holding costs; see also [16] . According to [16] For a Markov decision process (MDP) with finite state and action sets, the optimal policies found by Howard's [5] policy iteration algorithm satisfy optimality equations and such policies are called canonical. Blackwell [1] proved the existence of a stationary policy that optimizes the expected total discounted reward for all discount factors β ∈ [β * , 1) for some β * ∈ [0, 1). Such policies are called Blackwell optimal. A policy is called bias optimal if the difference of the expected total discounted rewards between this policy and a Blackwell optimal policy tends to zero as β → 1. Veinott [17] modified Howard's [5] policy iteration algorithm to find a bias optimal policy. For continuous time problems, the values of the discount factor β close to 1 correspond to the values of the discount rate α close to zero, because essentially β = e −α . For an M/M/1 queue with one customer type and convex increasing holding costs, Haviv and Puterman [6] showed that there is either one optimal TRP or two optimal TRPs. If there are two optimal TRPs, the difference between their control levels is 1. Haviv and Puterman [6] also showed that the optimal TRP with the larger optimal control level is the unique bias optimal policy and, therefore, it is also Blackwell optimal. Lewis et al. [10] proved that a similar result holds for an M/M/k/N queue with several customer types and without holding costs.
In this article, we prove the existence of an optimal TRP for an M/M/k/N queue with holding costs depending on customer types. Unlike the case of zero holding costs, for which any stationary optimal policy is a TRP, a stationary optimal policy might not be a TRP, but it becomes a TRP after decisions are changed at appropriate states. In addition, we provide complete descriptions of the classes of stationary optimal policies, optimal TRPs, canonical policies, bias optimal policies, and Blackwell optimal policies. We show that the bias optimal policy for our problem is unique and it is also Blackwell optimal. Similar to the cases of one customer type [6] and several customer types without holding costs [10] , the bias optimal policy selects the largest optimal control level for each customer type. For all customer types, except at most one, there exist at most two optimal control levels. Under a certain condition, there is one customer type for whom there are more than two optimal control levels. For this customer type, the largest optimal control level is N.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider the M/M/k/N queue defined in Section 1. First, we discuss the natural properties of reward functions r j (n). Then we provide the problem formulation.
Let X(t) = 0, 1, . . . , N − k be the position of a customer in the queue at time t after its arrival. In particular, X(t) = 0 if the customer is in service at time t and X(t) = n if the customer is in the queue and there are n − 1 customers in front of it. Observe that X(t) does not depend on future arrivals and decisions. Moreover, let R j be the reward an admitted type j customer pays for the service and h j (X(t), t) ≥ 0 be the rate the system incurs holding cost to the admitted type j customer when the position of this customer is X(t) at time t.
Additionally, we let D n , n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, be the delay for an admitted customer seeing n customers in the system at the arrival time and let W n be the waiting time for such a customer. In other words, if a customer is admitted when there are n customers in the system, the admitted customer spends W n units of time in the system and D n units of time in the queue waiting until the service begins.
If type j arrival is admitted when there are n customers in the system, the expected holding cost H d j (n) incurred during the time the customer waits for service in the queue is 
Notice that the above definition of holding costs covers the following two situations: (1) GI/M/1/N queues with holding costs per unit time depending on the number of customers in the system [6, 15] , and (2) GI/M/k/N queues with holding costs per unit time depending on the number of customers in the queue. Furthermore, in these cases, it is possible to consider holding costs that do not depend on customer types; that is, h j (i, t) = h(i, t). For situation 1, let c n be the holding cost per unit time if there are n customers in the system. We define c −1 = 0 and c n = c n − c n−1 . By setting h j (i, t) = h(i, t) = c i , we have that the holding cost per unit time for our problem is n i=0 h(i, t) = c n . For situation 2, let c n be the holding cost per unit time if there are n customers in the queue. By setting c n = c n − c n−1 and h j (i, t) = h(i, t) = c i , the holding cost per unit time for our problem is also
depending on a particular problem. In the either case, the functions r j (n) possess some natural properties. For example, r j (n) = r j (0)
. In either case, it is natural to assume that r j (0) > 0. Otherwise, type j customers should be always rejected. If h j (X(t), t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, then r j (n) = r j (0) = R j for all n. If h j are measurable functions such that a ≤ h j (X(t), t) ≤ b for two finite positive constants a and b, then (a/kμ) ≤ r j (n − 1) − r j (n) ≤ (b/kμ) for n ≥ k. We assume the following broad and natural condition throughout this article. We formulate our problem as a continuous-time Markov decision process (CTMDP) with the state space S = {0, 1, . . . , N}. State n means that there are n customers in the system. A(n) is the set of actions available at state n and A = N n=0 A(n). An action a ∈ A(n) is the set of the customer types to be admitted at state n and a = ∅ means that no customer is accepted. Thus, A(n), n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, contains 2 m actions, which are all of the possible subsets of {1, 2, . . . , m}, and A(N) = {∅}. Each action a ∈ A(n) defines a transition intensity λ a n = j∈a λ j and an expected reward per unit time R(n, a) = j∈a λ j r j (n). Since S and A are finite, there exists a (nonrandomized) stationary optimal policy for our problem. Thus, in the rest of this article, we focus on the set of all stationary policies and let F be this set. For any f ∈ F, we denote by f n the action that f chooses from A(n) at state n. We also define f (n, j) as follows:
Moreover, the policy f defines a vector of expected reward per unit time R( f ) whose
. . , N, and q(l|n, f n ) = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, let P nl (t, f ) be the probability that the process is at state l at time t, given that the process started at state n at time 0 under policy f . We let P(t, f ) be the corresponding matrix. Then P(t, f ) converges to the steady probability matrix P * ( f ) as t → ∞. We denote by v f n the average reward per unit time, given that the process starts at state n under f , and by V f the vector whose
where R(x t , a t ) is the expected reward per unit time collected when the process is at state x t and action a t is chosen at time t, and
Our goal is to find an optimal policy that maximizes the vector V f . Note that there is only one recurrent class under any policy from F. Such CTMDPs are called unichain. Since the CTMDP is unichain, all rows of P * ( f ) are equal to the unique steady-state probability vector (π *
Thus, all elements of V f are equal and 
For a unichain CTMDP with finite states and action sets, a canonical policy always exists, is optimal, and Howard's policy iteration algorithm computes it; see [20] . Similar to discrete-time MDPs, an optimal policy might not be canonical.
AVERAGE REWARD OPTIMALITY
The results of Feinberg and Reiman [4, Thm. 3.1] imply that for any M/M/k/N queue with m customer types and without holding costs, any stationary optimal policy is a TRP; see also [10] for a simpler proof of this fact. In addition, Feinberg and Reiman [4] showed that under any optimal policy f , if
In this section, we prove the existence of an optimal TRP for the problem with holding costs and obtain the structure of the canonical policies. Contrary to the results for problems without holding costs [4, 10] , a stationary optimal policy might not be a TRP; see Examples 3.1 and 3.2. However, under some conditions, we show that an optimal policy has a closely related form that we call essential trunk reservation. Moreover, because r j (n) depend on the customer types and the states, we show in Example 3.1 that
under an optimal TRP f .
In order to compute an optimal policy for our problem, consider the following equations for a CTMDP [11] :
where y f is the bias vector and f ∈ F. According to [11] ,
We denote by y
for n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
Miller [11] presented a version of Howard's policy iteration algorithm [5] for the optimal admission problem for any M/M/k/loss queue with several customer types. In that version, Miller [11] considered relative bias functions ∇y f n instead of bias functions y f n . The same can be done for birth-and-death processes and reward functions depending on the states. In addition, for any f ∈ F and n = 0, 1, . . . , N, we
where
The following is a modification of Miller's algorithm [11] for an M/M/k/N queue with reward functions depending on states and customer types. 
In order to compute the relative bias functions ∇y f n , Miller [11] transformed (3) into (5) . The following statements are the descriptions for a canonical policy. 
Proof:
(a)-(b) According to [11] , (5) is the same as (3). Thus, from (1), a policy f is canonical if and only if
Therefore, f is canonical if and only if H f (n, ∇y Proof: Assume f ∈ F * rejects all customer types at state n, n < k. Then f is also optimal for an M/M/k/loss queue. However, according to [4, 10, 11] , f always accepts type l customers with r l (0) = max j=1,2,...,m r j (0) if there is at least one empty server. This contradiction implies this theorem.
For the problem without holding costs, all optimal policies are TRPs [4, 10] and, thus, all canonical policies are TRPs. In the case with holding costs, r j (n) might decrease with respect to n for n ≥ k − 1, and it is possible that all customer types will be rejected even if there is available space in the system. Thus, the corresponding Markov chain might contain transient states. If an optimal TRP is changed at these states, then it remains optimal, but it is not a TRP anymore. The following example illustrates this possibility. (ii) If r j (n) < ∇y f n and n ∈ R f , then f (n, j) = {reject}.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Below are the definition of the restriction of a policy and the definition of an essential trunk reservation policy. Let C * be the set of all canonical policies, E * be the set of all optimal ETRPs, and T * be the set of all optimal TRPs. Then the following theorem links the sets of optimal policies F * , canonical policies C * , optimal ETRPs E * , and optimal TRPs T * .
A policy f ∈ F is called an essential trunk reservation policy (ETRP) if f R ∈ F is a TRP.

Theorem 3.2:
A policy f ∈ F * if and only if f R ∈ C * . In addition, T * ⊆ E * ⊆ F * . In the case with zero holding costs, T * = C * = E * = F * . The following example shows that there might exist a canonical policy that is not an ETRP for our problem.
Example 3.2:
Consider an M/M/1/5 queue with three customer types, where Note that f = f R and f R is not an ETRP. Equation (5) also implies that f is a canonical policy.
The following formula describes an arbitrary canonical policy for Example 3.2: This description contrasts to the result without holding costs [10] , for which there exist at most two optimal control levels for each customer type. We also observe that in Example 3.2, there is only one customer type with more than two optimal control levels. In Theorem 3.4, we will show that if, as stated in Condition 2.1, different customer types have different reward functions, then there exists only one customer type with more than two optimal control levels. In addition, Condition 3.1 provides necessary and sufficient conditions when such customer type exists. In order to formulate Condition 3.1, Definition 3.3, and Theorems 3.3 and 3.4, we need the following two lemmas.
Furthermore, let f accept all customer types if and only if the system is empty. Then v
Equation (5) and Theorem 3.1 imply ∇y Proof: We prove this lemma by contradiction. Let n f = min{n f , n g }. Then state n f is recurrent under both f and g. Assume that ∇y g n = ∇y f n for some n = 0, 1, . . . , n f − 1. Since g n = ∅ and f n = ∅, Lemma 3.1 implies H g (n, ∇y 
From Lemma 3.4, N f does not depend on f ∈ F * . We let N * = N f for any optimal policy f . Lemma 3.4 implies
Example 3.2 satisfies the following condition, which indicates the existence of a pathological customer type i.As shown later, this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a canonical policy that is not a TRP. In particular, statement (c) in Theorem 3.3 means that for each customer type j, there exist at most two optimal control levels and if there are two different optimal control levels M j and M j , where M j > M j , then M j = M j + 1. A policy is canonical if and only if it is a TRP that follows one of these optimal control levels for each customer type. Theorem 3.3 implies Corollary 3.1. Statement (iii) in Theorem 3.4 means that for each customer type j, j = i, there exist at most two optimal control levels. If there are two different optimal control levels, then one of them is greater than the other by 1. Since N * < N − 1, for customer type i, there exist more than two optimal control levels, which are N * , N * + 1, . . . , N. A TRP is optimal if and only if it follows these optimal control levels. To prove Theorem 3.3, Theorem 3.4, and Corollary 3.1, we need Lemmas 3.5 to 3.9.
Lemma 3.5: If f ∈ C * , then the following statements hold:
Thus, ∇y Lemma 3.7: The following statements hold:
In view of Lemma 3.7(ii), we set u n = ∇y f n for any f ∈ C * . Lemma 3.7(i) implies that
and this lemma and (6) imply that
For j = 1, 2, . . . , m, we define M j and M j as follows:
Lemma 3.8: A policy f ∈ C * if and only if, for all j = 1, 2, . . . , m,
Proof: Condition 2.1 and (8) imply respectively that the functions r j (n), j = 1, 2, . . . , m, are nonincreasing in n and the numbers u n are nondecreasing in n. This implies that
Let f ∈ C * . Then u n = ∇y f n , n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, and Proposition 3.1(c) implies (12) . Now, let f satisfy (12) . Consider g ∈ C * . Then according to the proven necessary part, g satisfies (12) also with f substituted in g in (12) . For statement (ii), (5) (10) and (11), we (10) and (11) 
BIAS AND BLACKWELL OPTIMALITY
If F * contains two or more policies, bias optimality can be applied to find the policy that maximizes the bias vector among all policies from F * . Haviv and Puterman [6] considered an M/M/k/N queue with one customer type and convex increasing holding costs. They proved that there exist at most two optimal control levels for the customers and if there are two different optimal control levels, the difference between them is 1. They also showed that the bias optimal policy is unique, it is the policy that selects the larger optimal control level for the customers, and it is also Blackwell optimal. Lewis et al. [10] extended these results to M/M/k/N queues with multiple customer types and without holding costs. For the problem with several customer types and holding costs, we also show that the bias optimal policy is unique and selects the largest optimal control level for each customer type. Unlike the cases considered in [6] and [10] , Example 3.2 demonstrates the possibility that there are more than two optimal control levels for one customer type. For this customer type, the optimal control level under the bias optimal policy is N. Condition 3.1 provides the necessary and sufficient condition when there are more than two optimal control levels for some customer type. This customer type exists if and only if Condition 3.1 holds, this type is the type i described in Condition 3.1, and the number of optimal control levels for any other customer type j cannot exceed two. The following are the definitions of bias optimality and Blackwell optimality. The following theorem describes the bias optimal policy g. Thus, g is not bias optimal. This contradiction implies that case (i) is impossible.
(ii) Let n ∈ T g . Then n g < n ≤ N − 1. From (6) we have N * < ≤ n g − 1 < N − 1. From Lemma 3. Observe that g(n g , j) = {reject} and n g ∈ R g . According to case (i), y g 0 < y f 0 for the policy f that coincides with g at all pairs (n , j ) except the pair (n g , j), where f (n g , j) = {accept}. Thus, g is not bias optimal. This contradiction completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Lemmas 3.8 and 4.1 imply that a policy g is bias optimal if and only if for all j = 1, 2, . . . , m, f (n, j) = {accept}; if n < M j {reject}; ifn ≥ M j .
Since the bias optimal policy is unique, it is Blackwell optimal because Blackwell optimal policies are bias optimal. For discrete-time MDPs, this fact is in [14, Thm. 10.1.5], and for CTMDPs, this follows from the discrete-time result and uniformization. The remaining statements follow from Theorems 3.3 and 3.4.
From Theorem 4.1, we know that the bias optimal policy g is the policy that selects the largest optimal control level for each customer type. Thus, after obtaining a canonical policy f from policy iteration algorithm, the bias optimal policy g can be found by the formula g n = f n ∪ {j = 1, 2, . . . , m : r j (n) = u n } for n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
